5GW Theory Timeline

Responding to John Robb’s accusation that he is attempting “to refashion global guerrillas as his big idea”, Thomas P. M. Barnett affirms that he did not “employ” 5GW in his books but thought that his own published ideas correlate with some contemporary, blogospheric discussion of fifth generation warfare.

To me, the shifting of the conversation from 4GW to 5GW that this universe of bloggers is pursuing seems natural enough: since 4GW is viewed as an asymmetrical response to our “overmatch” in 3GW capabilities, it’s only natural that our attempted response to 4GW be cast as some further iteration.

The claim is made that John Robb’s sensitivity — “since he offers his own, particularly striking definition of 5GW” — may be related to the fact that John Robb’s book is nearing publication; also, that his own (Barnett’s) attempt to fit his ideas within the framework of 5GW has come as a result of having his own ideas already discussed within that context by other bloggers.

Although appreciating John Robb’s exploration of the dynamic of Global Guerrillas — “specifically some of his descriptions of the dynamics we’ll meet from nonstate actors in coming years” — Thomas Barnett does not believe the GG phenomenon constitutes a new form of warfare, nor that the threats explored by John Robb are as serious as John Robb describes them:

I see them primarily as friction in globalization’s advance, just the latest (and most cynical and self-serving) iteration of individual-level resistance to the global economy’s advance.

Finally, TPMB considers the “Long War” and notes that much more friction will occur within the Gap:

But make no mistake, there will be future decisions to open fronts in this Long War—many of them over time. I believe all will be located within the Gap. I also recognize that all will be considered hopeless diversions to some, and God knows that some will be, as we’re unlikely to make wise choices throughout a decades-long struggle.

But I don’t believe this Long War will become the defining reality of globalization, because I don’t see nonstate actors, nor their networks, becoming stronger over time, much less dominant. John sees these “networked tribes” as being already dominant, a view I often run into in this business, but one that I find pointlessly hyperbolic—hence my complete lack of desire to claim any of it for my own definitions of future warfare.

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