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Blog Post published by Curtis Gale Weeks on July 5, 2006 |
| Site: Dreaming 5GW | |
| Permalink to original: "Observing the Maturing World" |
Summary:
A mapping of the xGW framework onto John Boyd’s OODA theory utilizing a Revised OODA developed by Curtis Gale Weeks. Part 3 of a 3-part series on the OODA, following “Rethinking the OODA” and “EBO is Everything in War — Almost”.
The post has several sections:
Introduction — in which the previous post in the series, on EBO, is summarized. The limitations of EBO are thought to be a result of the difference between reason, which is informed by past experiences/learning, and concrete cause/effect chains occuring in the present. I.e., observations in the present, which EBO tries to influence, are not the sole determinant of an individual’s decision to act in a particular way; thus, EBO is limited. However, no one may conduct warfare or engage in conflict without altering the present physical environment, which means that EBO, of some form, is important to modern warfare.
We Observe, We Orient, We Decide/Act — a section which examines Dan tdaxp’s and William Lind’s ideas concerning the generational warfare model, focusing on the observational aspects of each generation. Whereas Dan tdaxp considered the way each successive generation of warfare attempts to attack the enemy’s decision process by “going deeper” into the enemy’s OODA, and William Lind focused on the technological and tactical differences between each succeeding generation, both approaches may be seen to reflect changes in observational capability due to changing technology and changing societal forces.
Going Deeper into OODA — in which Dan tdaxp’s mapping of xGW onto John Boyd’s OODA is considered in depth, in light of the previous sections of the post, with a reiteration of the importance of EBO as characterized in the previous post in the series.
And Deeper…… — in which a new mapping of xGW is offered, but onto the Revised OODA designed by CGW, followed by notes explaining the implications and variations upon previous mappings:
The blog post was later cross-posted to the blog Dreaming 5GW. (Original site is now defunct.)
- Links to:
- “Orientation and Action, Part I: The OODA Loop” posted on tdaxp 07-18-2005
- Includes descriptions of the generations/gradients of warfare:
- On 0GW(XvX table)
- [No Description Given]
- On 1GW(XvX table)
- "While it is true that 1GW forces had a bit more observational capability — reconnaissance capability — ..., one’s own scouts or the spies in an enemy’s encampment would have been greatly limited in what they could observe and report. In the first place, their reports would have been old news by the time they were received by one’s generals — perhaps months old in the case of espionage activity; perhaps days old if movement from the enemy forces to one’s own force (to report) required days. Individual movements on the battlefield once battle had commenced would be too chaotic, ever-shifting, man-to-man, making the scout relatively useless. Furthermore, a limited range weapon must still be targeted, and targeting elements behind the enemy lines — or beyond the range of those weapons — would have been relatively useless. In the case of limited long-range capabilities, the targeting mechanisms then in use were relatively primitive; it was enough if the cannonball or shell hit somewhere the enemy was if it hit behind the front line."
- On 2GW(XvX table)
- "2GW observational capabilities were improved by speed of communication as well as targeting of weaponry. The telegraph and railway sped up long-range communications, and rifles and artillery had better aim as well as better reach. Primitive air forces also increased, and sped up, observational capabilities. Greater fire power in artillery and aerial bombings meant that one could more accurately target more enemies whenever one used these things (unlike, say, a cannonball in the previous generation that might have hit nothing when it fell or only one or a handful of enemies. I.e., increased destruction capability actually helped limit the need to know an exact enemy placement.)"
- On 3GW(XvX table)
- "3GW also saw the improvement in observational capabilities — a necessary improvement if one is to know where one’s enemy is, exactly, and how that enemy’s forces and strongholds are organized, in order to know how to maneuver most effectively to disrupt and overcome that enemy’s defenses. Again, improved air forces, communications technologies, transportation, and firepower improved one’s observational range and speed. Keeping one’s own forces in contact, and operating efficiently and not at cross-purposes, also required quicker communications and observational capabilities."
- On 4GW(XvX table)
- "4GW continues the trend. The Internet, for instance, is being used by 4GWarriors even as I type this. Satellite communications, cell phones, thumbnail disk drives, and the net of media sources criss-crossing the globe allow the fast transmission of data, increasing observational capability. Despite this fact, 4GW insurgents and terrorists are often quite separate from their enemies: they may live among an enemy society, but they have yet to infiltrate into the Deepest realm of their enemies’ forces; i.e., be among those forces without being detected. (Admittedly, infiltration of the Iraqi defense forces has somewhat occurred, and in all likelihood infiltration of the Iraqi government has also occurred at some level. But infiltration of the U.S. armed forces or government? Unlikely, although the theft of databases — such as the recently-stolen armed forces personnel database — and intercept communications might give 4GW forces a window-peek into the U.S. operations. Or else, the New York Times will boldly publish details of those operations.)"
- On 5GW(XvX table)
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"5GW, as broadly outlined by Dan at tdaxp in the linked post and as I’ve theorized, might seek an even broader-ranged observational capability than that currently available to 4GW forces; namely, very deep-level infiltration of a society, a society’s armed forces, and a society’s institutions and government, or else open communication of intentions from proxy warriors who are nonetheless unaware that they are being so used....
5GW... is the deepest of all, so entrenched within the target, the target does not know that the 5GW force exists. When the target makes any decision, the target believes it is in full command of its decision-making ability. The 5GW force merely creates information in relation to other information-sets it has not created; the target observes all information available and continues on his way toward making a decision and acting. Selective information creation will be the 5GW force’s modus operandi, and the 5GW force’s goal is to have the target act on that information."
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