The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
Hammes, Thomas X.. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century.
Saint Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004.
The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century
by USMC, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes
by USMC, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes
Ongoing events in Iraq show how difficult it is for the world’s only remaining superpower to impose its will upon other peoples. From Vietnam, French and US, to Afghanistan, Russian and US, to Israel and the Palestinians, to Somalia and Kosovo, recent history is replete with powerful military forces being tied up by seemingly weaker opponents. This is Fourth Generation War (4GW), and Colonel Thomas Hammes, United States Marine Corps, tells you all about it.Hammes includes an overview of warfare through the ages as well as recommendations for prescriptive actions in today’s world. This is an insightful book analysing the strengths and weaknesses of coventional military power against an enemy with a superior political willpower and ability to fight over time using unconventional means.
The book, which primarily considers 4GW, mentions 5GW briefly in three places near the end:
- First, by stating that innovative leadership training will be required “not just to deal with the seventy-year-old phenomenon of 4GW but also to deal with 5GW as it evolves.” [pages 274-275, paperback edition.]
- “Only a highly flexible organization can hope to succeed in 4GW and still be prepared to deal with emerging 5GW…” & “We can continue to man 3GW organizations using an 1890s personnel system….Or we can accept that 4GW has arrived and that 5GW is evolving and organize ourselves accordingly.” [page 289, paperback edition.]
- “Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the fifth generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may not recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures and see each as fifth-generation war.” The bio-attacks on Capitol Hill — anthrax and ricin — are considered a precursor of 5GW; Hammes emphasizes the superempowered destructive individual or small group as a viable, perhaps defining aspect of 5GW. He then reiterates his belief that the U.S. should reorganize its military and societal capability for dealing with 4GW forces and 5GW forces that may evolve — but does not suggest that America should develop 5GW force structures itself. I.e., 4GW and 5GW will characterize the opponent, not the U.S. [pages 290-291, paperback edition; last two pages of the book.]
On 1GW:
“The first generation of war grew not just from the invention of gunpowder but also from the political, economic, and social structures that developed as Europe transitioned from a feudal system to a system of nation-states ruled by monarchs…
Massed manpower had been the rule in ancient Greece and Rome and had even been a major part of war during the Middle Ages. However, the combination of changes across society provided the much larger armies and massed direct-fire weapons that marked the culmination of the first generation of war at Waterloo.”
Massed manpower had been the rule in ancient Greece and Rome and had even been a major part of war during the Middle Ages. However, the combination of changes across society provided the much larger armies and massed direct-fire weapons that marked the culmination of the first generation of war at Waterloo.”
On 2GW:
“Several key factors normally associated with second-generation war (2GW) drove the supremacy of the defense over the offense: machine guns, magazine-fed rifles, rapid-fire artillery, and barbed wire. The combined effect of these elements took away freedom of movement and forced both sides to rely on firepower—mostly indirect firepower—in tactical engagements.”
On 3GW:
“Although still primarily an infantry army, the Germans organized their armored forces into Panzer Corps and used them to shatter the cohesion of the Allied forces. The result was another astonishing victory. Britain was evacuating its forces from Dunkirk only sixteen days after the invasion. France lasted only another month. In contrast to four bloody years of stalemate in World War I, the Germans conquered France in weeks. The victory stunned the Western powers. They were certain the Germans had created an entirely new form of warfare.
Third-generation warfare had arrived.”
Third-generation warfare had arrived.”
On 4GW:
“Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society’s networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy’s military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy’s political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy—measured in decades rather than months or years.”
On 5GW:
“Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the fifth generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may not recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures and see each as fifth-generation war.”
Filed in Book and tagged X vs X, xGW vs GMW