XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom
Herring, Adam. "XGW: Left of Boom - Right of Boom." Dreaming 5GW. October 21, 2007. http://www.dreaming5gw.com/2007/10/xgw_left_of_boom_right_of_boom.php (accessed September 8, 2009).
Arherring explores the relationship of xGW theory to the idea of “Boom” (kinetic action), using the following diagram to map out the generations:
On 1GW:
”1GW Operative Action: Organization and concentration of mass to move toward or from key points on the field of battle.
Hannibal to Napoleon, the great captains of history knew the key to victory lay in attacking into and from, or holding, the key points of the battlefield. To do this most effectively, they organized their army, and the force represented by its mass, in order to most effectively and efficiently accomplish this. The organization and placement of mass in 1GW puts it just to the left of Boom on the continuum.”
Hannibal to Napoleon, the great captains of history knew the key to victory lay in attacking into and from, or holding, the key points of the battlefield. To do this most effectively, they organized their army, and the force represented by its mass, in order to most effectively and efficiently accomplish this. The organization and placement of mass in 1GW puts it just to the left of Boom on the continuum.”
On 2GW:
”2GW Operative Action: Destruction of an opponent’s mass in order to weaken the opponent to the point that resistance is impossible.
As the “King of the Battlefield” artillery ruled the muddy trenches of World War 1, just as air power shattered any resistance inside the “Kill Box” of the First Gulf War, and with the “Shock and Awe” of the Second Gulf War. Both are examples of the 2GW effort to cause enough direct attrition of enemy forces that the opponent is unable to organize and concentrate its mass, becoming unable to effectively resist. However, without the kinetic action the attrition does not occur. This places 2GW just to the right of the Boom.”
As the “King of the Battlefield” artillery ruled the muddy trenches of World War 1, just as air power shattered any resistance inside the “Kill Box” of the First Gulf War, and with the “Shock and Awe” of the Second Gulf War. Both are examples of the 2GW effort to cause enough direct attrition of enemy forces that the opponent is unable to organize and concentrate its mass, becoming unable to effectively resist. However, without the kinetic action the attrition does not occur. This places 2GW just to the right of the Boom.”
On 3GW:
”3GW Operative Action: Dislocation of the opponent by attacking and defending critical vulnerabilities.
When an opponent is dislocated positionally, functionally, morally or temporally, the opponent loses the ability to oppose effectively, this is the essence of 3GW/Manuever warfare. In relation to kinetics, however, does 3GW move to fight or fight to move? This question has a direct bearing on the placement of 3GW relative to the Boom. While ‘a boom’ may occur before the movement occurs, the dislocative aspect of the movement prior to ‘the Boom’ (or the overwhelming threat of the Boom on a critical vulnerability of the opponent), places 3GW on the timeline farther to the left of both the Boom and 1GW.”
When an opponent is dislocated positionally, functionally, morally or temporally, the opponent loses the ability to oppose effectively, this is the essence of 3GW/Manuever warfare. In relation to kinetics, however, does 3GW move to fight or fight to move? This question has a direct bearing on the placement of 3GW relative to the Boom. While ‘a boom’ may occur before the movement occurs, the dislocative aspect of the movement prior to ‘the Boom’ (or the overwhelming threat of the Boom on a critical vulnerability of the opponent), places 3GW on the timeline farther to the left of both the Boom and 1GW.”
On 4GW:
”4GW Operative Action: Using a disruptive attack or threat of disruptive attack to cause the perception of an unwinnable situation in an opponent, resulting in a loss of morale or will until the opponent is rendered incapacitated.
Even more than 3GW, 4GW employs a threat of kinetic action more than actual kinetic action. At first glance it may seem that the threat of attack always precedes the Boom. However, without the Boom or the perceived threat of the Boom there is no effective attack on the will of the opponent. This places the operative action of 4GW on the continuum farther to the right than the Boom and 2GW.”
Even more than 3GW, 4GW employs a threat of kinetic action more than actual kinetic action. At first glance it may seem that the threat of attack always precedes the Boom. However, without the Boom or the perceived threat of the Boom there is no effective attack on the will of the opponent. This places the operative action of 4GW on the continuum farther to the right than the Boom and 2GW.”
On 5GW:
”5GW Operative Action: Manipulation and influence in order to define and shape outcomes and effects.
5GW embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of the battlefield so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs the outcome is essentially predetermined. The opponent is, as a result, without resistance because the response is by the target’s own choice or follows a previously established pattern that is familiar to the target. This places 5GW far to the left of 3GW, 1GW and the Boom on the timeline.”
5GW embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of the battlefield so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs the outcome is essentially predetermined. The opponent is, as a result, without resistance because the response is by the target’s own choice or follows a previously established pattern that is familiar to the target. This places 5GW far to the left of 3GW, 1GW and the Boom on the timeline.”
Filed in Blog Post and tagged X vs X, xGW vs GMW