X vs X Table: 0GW - 2GW | 3GW - 5GW | 0GW - 5GW

"First generation warfare reflects tactics of the era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors — the line maximized firepower, rigid drill was necessary to generate a high rate of fire, etc.— and partially in response to social conditions and ideas, e.g., the columns of the French revolutionary armies reflected both the élan of the revolution and the low training levels of conscripted troops. Although rendered obsolete with the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountered desire for linearity on the battlefield. Operational art in the first generation did not exist as a concept although it was practiced by individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon."

"Second generation warfare was a response to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machinegun, and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement, and they remained essentially linear. The defense still attempted to prevent all penetrations, and in the attack a laterally dispersed line advanced by rushes in small groups. Perhaps the principal change from first generation tactics was heavy reliance on indirect fire; second generation tactics were summed up in the French maxim, "the artillery conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. Second generation tactics remained the basis of U.S. doctrine until the 1980s, and they are still practiced by most American units in the field."

" Third generation warfare was also a response to the increase in battlefield firepower. However, the driving force was primarily ideas. Aware they could not prevail in a contest of materiel because of their weaker industrial base in World War I, the Germans developed radically new tactics. Based on maneuver rather than attrition, third generation tactics were the first truly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on infiltration to bypass and collapse the enemy's combat forces rather than seeking to close with and destroy them. The defense was in depth and often invited penetration, which set the enemy up for a counterattack.

While the basic concepts of third generation tactics were in place by the end of 1918, the addition of a new technological element-tanks-brought about a major shift at the operational level in World War II. That shift was blitzkrieg. In the blitzkrieg, the basis of the operational art shifted from place (as in Liddell-Hart's indirect approach) to time."

"In broad terms, fourth generation warfare seems likely to be widely dispersed and largely undefined; the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point. It will be nonlinear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. The distinction between "civilian" and "military" may disappear. Actions will occur concurrently throughout all participants' depth, including their society as a cultural, not just a physical, entity. Major military facilities, such as airfields, fixed communications sites, and large headquarters will become rarities because of their vulnerability; the same may be true of civilian equivalents, such as seats of government, power plants, and industrial sites (including knowledge as well as manufacturing industries). Success will depend heavily on effectiveness in joint operations as lines between responsibility and mission become very blurred. Again, all these elements are present in third generation warfare; fourth generation will merely accentuate them."

"The first generation of war grew not just from the invention of gunpowder but also from the political, economic, and social structures that developed as Europe transitioned from a feudal system to a system of nation-states ruled by monarchs...
Massed manpower had been the rule in ancient Greece and Rome and had even been a major part of war during the Middle Ages. However, the combination of changes across society provided the much larger armies and massed direct-fire weapons that marked the culmination of the first generation of war at Waterloo."

"Several key factors normally associated with second-generation war (2GW) drove the supremacy of the defense over the offense: machine guns, magazine-fed rifles, rapid-fire artillery, and barbed wire. The combined effect of these elements took away freedom of movement and forced both sides to rely on firepower--mostly indirect firepower--in tactical engagements."

"Although still primarily an infantry army, the Germans organized their armored forces into Panzer Corps and used them to shatter the cohesion of the Allied forces. The result was another astonishing victory. Britain was evacuating its forces from Dunkirk only sixteen days after the invasion. France lasted only another month. In contrast to four bloody years of stalemate in World War I, the Germans conquered France in weeks. The victory stunned the Western powers. They were certain the Germans had created an entirely new form of warfare.
Third-generation warfare had arrived."

"Fourth-generation warfare (4GW) uses all available networks--political, economic, social, and military--to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. It is an evolved form of insurgency. Still rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat greater economic and military power, 4GW makes use of society's networks to carry on its fight. Unlike previous generations of warfare, it does not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the networks, it directly attacks the minds of enemy decision makers to destroy the enemy's political will. Fourth-generation wars are lengthy--measured in decades rather than months or years."

"Fourth-generation war has been around for more than seventy years; no doubt the fifth generation is evolving even as we attempt to deal with its predecessor. We may not recognize it as it evolves around us. Or we may look at several alternative futures and see each as fifth-generation war."

"

• example: Napoleonic War


• characteristic: mass armies


• method of fighting: man-to-man

1GWs, like the Napoleon Wars, were extremely fluid. Armies could march whenever men’s feet could carry them. Information was relatively symmetrical — precise locations of either army were unavailable to any commander, while general knowledge of the land was known to all commanders....1GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy’s ability to decide and act. "

"

• example: First World War


• characteristic: mass armies


• method of fighting: fixed-artillery-to-men

2GWs, like the First World War, were sticky. Armies took marched, drove, or took trains to the front line — where they stopped. In 2nd Generation War, action is easy: charge. You know exactly where you are, exactly where the enemy is, and exactly where you are going to die...2GW was defined by conflict centered around an enemy’s ability to orient and decide."

"

• example: Second World War


• characteristic: blitzkrieg, fast transitions from one maneuver to the next


• method of fighting: tanks/bombers-to-cities/armies

3GWs, like the trenches for most of the Second World War or the Lawrence of Arabia campaign in the First World War, were fluid again. But conflict kept burrowing deeper into the OODA loop and redshifting further away from action. Victory in 3rd Generation Wars required the ability to instill madness — to mess with the enemy’s minds. The purpose of 3rd Generation Warfare is to paralyze the enemy with doubt. We move even deeper into the OODA loop, to the red end of the rainbow. 3GW is defined by conflict centered around an enemy’s ability to orient. "

"

• example: Vietnam War


• characteristic: dispiriting the enemy


• method of fighting: propagandists-to-populations

If older generations of war were like fluids, 4GW was like a gas. It spreads everywhere yet regular armies have a hard time even finding battles. Like 3rd Generation Wars, 4th Generation Wars focus on the picture inside the enemy’s head. But while 3GW tries to destroy the picture, 4GW builds a new one....While 3GW tries to paralyze the enemy with doubt, 4GW tries to deny him even that much — 4GW drains the will of the enemy so he “waits and sees,” robbing him of his ability to want to do anything. In practice, this means 4GW tries to destroy an enemy’s civil society, turning his population into mindless cowards. To achieve this, 4GW is defined by conflict centered around Observe and Orient."

" If traditional war centered on an enemy’s physical strength, and 4GW on his moral strength, the 5th Generation of War would focus on his intellectual strength. A 5th Generation War might be fought with one side not knowing who it is fighting. Or even, a brilliantly executed 5GW might involve one side being completely ignorant that there ever was a war. "

"While it is true that 1GW forces had a bit more observational capability — reconnaissance capability — ..., one’s own scouts or the spies in an enemy’s encampment would have been greatly limited in what they could observe and report.  In the first place, their reports would have been old news by the time they were received by one’s generals — perhaps months old in the case of espionage activity; perhaps days old if movement from the enemy forces to one’s own force (to report) required days.  Individual movements on the battlefield once battle had commenced would be too chaotic, ever-shifting, man-to-man, making the scout relatively useless.  Furthermore, a limited range weapon must still be targeted, and targeting elements behind the enemy lines — or beyond the range of those weapons — would have been relatively useless.  In the case of limited long-range capabilities, the targeting mechanisms then in use were relatively primitive; it was enough if the cannonball or shell hit somewhere the enemy was if it hit behind the front line."

"2GW observational capabilities were improved by speed of communication as well as targeting of weaponry. The telegraph and railway sped up long-range communications, and rifles and artillery had better aim as well as better reach. Primitive air forces also increased, and sped up, observational capabilities.  Greater fire power in artillery and aerial bombings meant that one could more accurately target more enemies whenever one used these things (unlike, say, a cannonball in the previous generation that might have hit nothing when it fell or only one or a handful of enemies. I.e., increased destruction capability actually helped limit the need to know an exact enemy placement.)"

"3GW also saw the improvement in observational capabilities — a necessary improvement if one is to know where one’s enemy is, exactly, and how that enemy’s forces and strongholds are organized, in order to know how to maneuver most effectively to disrupt and overcome that enemy’s defenses.  Again, improved air forces, communications technologies, transportation, and firepower improved one’s observational range and speed.  Keeping one’s own forces in contact, and operating efficiently and not at cross-purposes, also required quicker communications and observational capabilities."

"4GW continues the trend.  The Internet, for instance, is being used by 4GWarriors even as I type this.  Satellite communications, cell phones, thumbnail disk drives, and the net of media sources criss-crossing the globe allow the fast transmission of data, increasing observational capability.  Despite this fact, 4GW insurgents and terrorists are often quite separate from their enemies: they may live among an enemy society, but they have yet to infiltrate into the Deepest realm of their enemies’ forces; i.e., be among those forces without being detected.  (Admittedly, infiltration of the Iraqi defense forces has somewhat occurred, and in all likelihood infiltration of the Iraqi government has also occurred at some level.  But infiltration of the U.S. armed forces or government?  Unlikely, although the theft of databases — such as the recently-stolen armed forces personnel database — and intercept communications might give 4GW forces a window-peek into the U.S. operations.  Or else, the New York Times will boldly publish details of those operations.)"

"5GW, as broadly outlined by Dan at tdaxp in the linked post and as I’ve theorized, might seek an even broader-ranged observational capability than that currently available to 4GW forces; namely, very deep-level infiltration of a society, a society’s armed forces, and a society’s institutions and government, or else open communication of intentions from proxy warriors who are nonetheless unaware that they are being so used....

5GW... is the deepest of all, so entrenched within the target, the target does not know that the 5GW force exists.  When the target makes any decision, the target believes it is in full command of its decision-making ability.  The 5GW force merely creates information in relation to other information-sets it has not created; the target observes all information available and continues on his way toward making a decision and acting.  Selective information creation will be the 5GW force’s modus operandi, and the 5GW force’s goal is to have the target act on that information."

"It seems to be that “G” measures the kinetic intensity of conflict, which every new G being approximately 20 times less intense than the one below it.

This holds up under a first analysis. Pre-Modern Warfare (the Zeroth Generation of Modern Warfare, “0GW,” about 0Gs) is unremittingly genocidal. If the AD 1900s had the same fatality-from-war rate as the 6000s BC, we should have seen something like two billion war deaths. We might say that form the dawn of man to the dawn of agriculture war meant from measuring around 0.1 Gs on the kinetic intensity scale to .9 Gs.

Or think of it another way: 0G Warfare focuses on ending an enemy’s ability to fight by killing their men."

"By the time we get to 4G Warfare almost none of the battle is in the field, but in the minds of men who will live regardless. "

"This 5GW we talk of seems to be even more mental and less physical, seeking to leave the men, material, and even will of the enemy essentially unchanged. If kinetic intensity is seen as morally bad, then every new G is a moral improvement. 5GW may truly be “moral war,” compared to everything that has come before."

"The first generation, or 1GW, emphasizes concentration-of-soldiers. The most famous 1GW was the Napoleonic Wars, where the commander who could throw the most soldiers at the decisive point would in the war. "

"The second generation, or 2GW, emphasizes concentration-of-force. The most famous 2GW was the western front of World War I, where the force that could concentrate the most artillery and explosive power at one point could win the day. Both 1GW and 2GW are made possible by reducing your fog of war, so that you know where your soldiers (1GW) or artillery (2GW) should go."

"The third generation, or 3GW, emphasizes maneuver. The most famous 3GW was the German Blitz against France in 1940, where the force that could break through and carry the commander’s intent would win the day."

"The fourth generation, or 4GW, emphasis networks. The most famous 4GW were the Communist insurgencies in Asia, where the force that could alienate the population from the other side through unconventional means would prevail in the end. Both 3GW and 4GW are made possible by maximizing your enemy’s fog of war, so he is unable to properly command his troops (3GW) or rely on his population (4GW)."

"The fifth generation of modern warfare, or 5GW, is more speculative. It is assumed that as each generation of modern warfare “goes deeper” into the enemy’s social thinking (from where he concentrates soldiers, to where he prepares for an artillery barrage, to how he springs back from a blitz that seems to come from everywhere, to what he does when faced with insurgents who kill the tax collector), 5GW will go deeper yet. As each higher generation of war looks less like “traditional” war than the generation before it, it has been argued that 5GW will not even appear to be a “war” at all…"

"Steve Pampinella, a friend of this blog, sent me a link to a very solid article, which wonders [if] the African Wars should be considered as part of the fourth generation of modern war (4GW)....

The short answer is No, the African wars are not 4GW. The African wars tend not to be state-centered, but that is because they are before-the-state, not after-the-state...Africa’s wars are pre-modern wars, or “0GW.” "

"Steve Pampinella, a friend of this blog, sent me a link to a very solid article, which wonders of the African Wars should be considered as part of the fourth generation of modern war (4GW)....

[R]eferring to the pre-modern African wars as “4GW” demonstrates a poor understanding of both Africa and 4GW."

"1GW Operative Action: Organization and concentration of mass to move toward or from key points on the field of battle.

Hannibal to Napoleon, the great captains of history knew the key to victory lay in attacking into and from, or holding, the key points of the battlefield. To do this most effectively, they organized their army, and the force represented by its mass, in order to most effectively and efficiently accomplish this. The organization and placement of mass in 1GW puts it just to the left of Boom on the continuum."

"2GW Operative Action: Destruction of an opponent’s mass in order to weaken the opponent to the point that resistance is impossible.

As the “King of the Battlefield” artillery ruled the muddy trenches of World War 1, just as air power shattered any resistance inside the “Kill Box” of the First Gulf War, and with the “Shock and Awe” of the Second Gulf War. Both are examples of the 2GW effort to cause enough direct attrition of enemy forces that the opponent is unable to organize and concentrate its mass, becoming unable to effectively resist. However, without the kinetic action the attrition does not occur. This places 2GW just to the right of the Boom."

"3GW Operative Action: Dislocation of the opponent by attacking and defending critical vulnerabilities.

When an opponent is dislocated positionally, functionally, morally or temporally, the opponent loses the ability to oppose effectively, this is the essence of 3GW/Manuever warfare. In relation to kinetics, however, does 3GW move to fight or fight to move? This question has a direct bearing on the placement of 3GW relative to the Boom. While ‘a boom’ may occur before the movement occurs, the dislocative aspect of the movement prior to ‘the Boom’ (or the overwhelming threat of the Boom on a critical vulnerability of the opponent), places 3GW on the timeline farther to the left of both the Boom and 1GW."

"4GW Operative Action: Using a disruptive attack or threat of disruptive attack to cause the perception of an unwinnable situation in an opponent, resulting in a loss of morale or will until the opponent is rendered incapacitated.

Even more than 3GW, 4GW employs a threat of kinetic action more than actual kinetic action. At first glance it may seem that the threat of attack always precedes the Boom. However, without the Boom or the perceived threat of the Boom there is no effective attack on the will of the opponent. This places the operative action of 4GW on the continuum farther to the right than the Boom and 2GW."

"5GW Operative Action: Manipulation and influence in order to define and shape outcomes and effects.

5GW embodies an overwhelming focus on positional manipulation and shaping of the battlefield so that when kinetic action or the threat of kinetic action occurs the outcome is essentially predetermined. The opponent is, as a result,  without resistance because the response is by the target’s own choice or follows a previously established pattern that is familiar to the target. This places 5GW far to the left of 3GW, 1GW and the Boom on the timeline."

"2GW defeats 1GW because, 1) 2GW forces can advance at multiple points, with some autonomy for the individual units, and 2) massed artillery is quite capable of dispersing the kinetic attacks on the field of battle."

"3GW defeats 2GW because of much greater mobility, circumventing with pro-action the 2GW position of artillery and combat units (not only in space but also in time.)"

"4GW defeats 3GW because of even more mobility: including even the option of moving among civilians or, indeed, among friendly forces.   Additionally, 4GW begins to make better use of memetic engineering, or of altering observations to create kinetic responses in individuals thus oriented, kinetic responses possibly quite far from the 3GW force’s field of battle: another degree of dispersal of kinetics.   The CoGs may include the morale of the population supporting the 3GW force; the CoGs may include destruction and murder within civilian populations, at any point civilians can be found."

"5GW defeats 4GW by refining memetic engineering, mulitplying domains to be shaped, and thus operating outside the scope of the 4GW observational range.   Changes which occur within an agricultural sector in a far removed nation-state (or T.A.Z.) may ultimately lead to effects within the 4GW force’s acknowledged field of battle; etc.   Indeed, the 4GW force’s concept of the field of battle may be altered."

"0GW is the heading for genocidal/survival warfare. Individuals fight for themselves and for the right of their line to survive."

"1GW encompasses projection of force to and from key geographical postions. The Spartans and Persians at Thermopylae is a good example of this as are the campaigns of Hannibal and many other battles from antiquity to modern times."

"2GW covers doctrines of attrition, where force is used to degrade the physical ability of the enemy to oppose you by direct force. Agincourt is a prime example of this but so are many battles in the American Civil War, WW1 and WW2."

"3GW is for doctrines that dislocate the strength of an enemy with a strike at the essential weakness of an enemy (2GW is strength on strength, and 3GW is strength on weakness). The German bypassing of the Maginot Line is an example of avoiding strength to attack weakness and displacing the enemy. This kind of displacement may be positional, temporal, material and/or moral. The Mongols were masters of this, so was ‘Stonewall Jackson’ and Erwin Rommel."

"4GW makes the jump into the moral that 3GW starts. 4GW doctrines strike at the enemy’s perceived ability to continue fighting. Scorched earth is an example of 4GW in that even before an invader feels the pinch of not being able to provide for themselves from conquered territory (even if alternative supply can be arranged) they begin to feel unable to continue the fight in the face of such destruction and resolution."

"5GW is even more subtle, it’s activity goes below perception into the context of conflict. What a target observes is manipulated in order to cause the target to react in a specific and completely natural manner."

"0 (Base) Gradient - Darwinian Warfare - 0GW

Confrontation and Conflict at its most basic level is an expression of natural selection. This genetic imperative is the principle behind any doctrine that is essentially the projection of Force for the survival of an individual organism.

Note: Howard Bloom argues in The Lucifer Principle that ideas/memes act in the same manner."

"First Gradient - Cooperative Warfare - 1GW

Cooperative warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of creating organizations that require the individual to surrender control to the group in order to project Force to accomplish goals that are necessary to the survival of the group."

"Second Gradient - Attrition Warfare - 2GW

The Principle behind attrition warfare describes doctrines that use the strength of the attacker to target the strength of the opponent."

"Third Gradient - Maneuver Warfare - 3GW

Maneuver Warfare doctrines are based upon the principle of avoiding the strength of the opponent in order to attack the critical vulnerability of the opponent.

Note: The principles of 2GW and 3GW are informed mostly by the thinking of Col. Robert Leonhard’s books, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle, and The Principles of War for the Information Age. He bases these principles upon the concepts and writings of Sun-Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, John Boyd, William Lind, and B. H. Liddell-Hart, among others."

"Fourth Gradient - Moral Warfare - 4GW

Fourth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of the attainment of a functional invulnerability that prevents the opponent from being able to orient upon a threat and creates a perception that saps the ability of the opponent to function effectively."

"Fifth Gradient - Contextual Warfare - 5GW

Fifth gradient doctrines are based upon the principle of manipulation of the context of the observations of an opponent in order to achieve a specific effect."